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ABSTRACT
Adjusted for many other determinants, beauty affects earnings; but does it lead directly to the
differences in productivity that we believe generate earnings differences? We take a large sample
of student instructional ratings for a group of university professors, acquire six independent
measures of their beauty and a number of other descriptors of them and their classes. Instructors who
are viewed as better looking receive higher instructional ratings, with the impact of a move from the
10th to the 90th percentile of beauty being substantial. This impact exists within university
departments and even within particular courses, and is larger for male than for female instructors.
Disentangling whether this outcome represents productivity or discrimination is, as with the issue
generally, probably impossible.
Daniel S. Hamermesh Amy M. Parker
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Texas University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712-1173 Austin, TX 78712-1173
and NBER amparker@mail.utexas.edu
hamermes@eco.utexas.eduIt was God who made me so beautiful.  If I weren’t, then I’d be a teacher. 
[Supermodel Linda Evangelista] 
 
I.  Introduction 
An immense literature in social psychology (summarized by Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986) 
has examined the impact of human beauty on a variety of noneconomic outcomes.  Recently 
economists have considered how beauty affects labor market outcomes, particularly earnings, and 
have attempted to infer the sources of its effects from the behavior of different economic agents 
(Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998).  The impacts on these monetary 
outcomes are implicitly the end results of the effects of beauty on productivity; but there seems to 
be no direct evidence of the impacts of beauty on productivity in a context in which we can be 
fairly sure that productivity generates economic rewards. 
A substantial amount of research has indicated that academic administrators pay attention 
to teaching quality in setting salaries (Becker and Watts, 1999).  A number of studies (e.g., Katz, 
1973; Siegfried and White, 1973; Kaun, 1984; Moore et al, 1998) have demonstrated that 
teaching quality generates ceteris paribus increases in salary (but see DeLorme et al, 1979).  The 
question is what generates the measured productivity for which the economic rewards are being 
offered.  One possibility is simply that ascriptive characteristics, such as beauty, trigger positive 
responses by students and lead them to evaluate some teachers more favorably, so that their 
beauty earns them higher economic returns. 
In this study we examine the productivity effects of beauty in the context of 
undergraduate education.
1  In particular, we consider the impact of professors’ looks on their 
instructional ratings in the courses that they teach.  In Section II we describe a data set that we 
                                                           
1Linking professors’ looks to their pedagogical productivity does not appear to have been done previously, 
but Goebel and Cashen (1979) and Buck and Tiene (1989) did ask students in various grades to comment 
on the teaching ability that they would expect from individuals of varying levels of beauty based on a set of 
photographs. Ambady and Rosenthal (1993), the only study to look at actual teaching evaluations (of 13 
TAs in a single course) focused on their nonverbal behavior but did touch on the effects of their 
attractiveness. 
   2
have created to analyze the impact of beauty on this indicator of professors’ productivity.  In 
Section III we discuss and interpret the results of studying these impacts.  Section IV presents the 
implications of the analysis for interpreting the impact of an ascriptive characteristic on economic 
outcomes as stemming from productivity effects or discrimination. 
II.  Measuring Teaching Productivity and Its Determinants 
  The University of Texas at Austin, like most other institutions of higher learning in the 
United States, requires its faculty to be evaluated by their students in every class.  A student 
administers the evaluation instrument while the professor is absent from the classroom.  The 
rating forms include: “Overall, this instructor was very unsatisfactory (1); unsatisfactory (2); 
satisfactory (3); very good (4); excellent (5);” and “Overall, this course was very unsatisfactory, 
unsatisfactory….” In the analysis we concentrate on responses to the second question, both 
because it seems more germane to inferring the instructor’s educational productivity, and 
because, in any event, the results for the two questions are nearly identical. 
  We chose professors at all levels of the academic hierarchy, obtaining professorial staffs 
from a number of departments that had posted all faculty members’ pictures on their departmental 
websites.  An additional ten faculty members’ pictures were obtained from miscellaneous 
departments around the University.  The average evaluation score for each undergraduate course 
that the faculty member taught during the academic years 2000-2002 is included.  This sample 
selection criterion resulted in 463 courses, with the number of courses taught by the sample 
members ranging from 1 to 13.  The classes ranged in size from 8 to 581 students, while the 
number of students completing the instructional ratings ranged from 5 to 380.  Underlying the 
463 sample observations are 16,957 completed evaluations from 25,547 registered students.   3
We also obtained information on each faculty member’s sex, whether on the tenure track 
or not, minority status and whether he/she was not educated in an English-speaking country.
2  
Table 1 presents the statistics describing these variables and the information about the classes.  
These descriptive statistics are generally unsurprising:  1) The average course rating is below that 
for the professor him/herself; 2) The average rating is around 4.0 (on the 5 to 1 scale), with a 
standard deviation of about 0.5; 3) Non-tenure track faculty are disproportionately assigned to 
lower-division courses.   
One might be surprised that the course and professor ratings are actually slightly (but 
insignificantly) lower in the upper-division courses, which contain mostly majors who should be 
favorably disposed to the instructor and the material.  The cause of this apparent anomaly is that 
higher-quality teachers are matched to the lower-division courses that typically contain more 
students.
3  Indeed, in a regression relating course ratings to class size and level, including fixed 
effects for each instructor, class size has a substantial negative impact on instructional ratings.
4 
  Each of the professors’ pictures was rated by each of six undergraduate students:  Three 
women and three men, with one of each gender being a lower-division, two upper-division 
students (to accord with the distribution of classes across the two levels).  The raters were told to 
use a 10 (highest) to 1 rating scale, to concentrate on the physiognomy of the professor in the 
picture, to make their ratings independent of age, and to keep 5 in mind as an average.  In the 
                                                           
2This last variable is designed to account for the possibility of lower productivity of foreign teachers (see 
Borjas, 2000, but also Fleisher et al, 2002) that might also be correlated with perceptions of their looks.  In 
fact, in our sample this correlation is only -0.02. 
 
3This near invariance of ratings to class size may result from the maximizing behavior by administrators, 
who assign faculty to classes so as to equalize their marginal products, as implied by Lazear (2001). 
  
4Included in the regression were variables measuring the course level, whether the course was for only one 
credit, and a quadratic in class size.  The coefficients on the quadratic in class size were -.00493 (s.e. = 
.00147) and .00000713 (s.e. = .0000053).  (The pair of terms in class size was highly significantly different 
from zero.)  Implicit in these estimates is a decline in the instructor’s evaluation until class size reaches 345 
students, which in our sample includes all but 5 of the 463 classes. 
   4
analyses we unit normalized each rating.  To reduce measurement error the six normalized ratings 
were summed to create a composite standardized beauty rating for each instructor. 
  Table 2 presents statistics describing the ratings of the professors’ beauty.  The students 
clearly had some difficulty holding to the instruction that they strive for an average rating of 5, as 
the averages of three of the six raw ratings were significantly below that, and none was 
significantly above (perhaps reflecting the students’ inability to judge these older people, perhaps 
reflecting the choices implied in the epigraph).  Moreover, the standardized ratings show that five 
of the six sets of ratings were skewed to the right.  There was some concern, based on 
observations in earlier research, that the distribution of ratings of female faculty might have 
higher variance than that of males.  While the variance was slightly higher, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic testing equality of the two distributions had a p-value of 0.077. 
Despite these minor difficulties, a central concern—that the assessments of beauty be 
consistent across raters—was achieved remarkably well.  The fifteen pairwise correlation 
coefficients of the standardized beauty ratings range from 0.54 to 0.72, with an average 
correlation coefficient of 0.62.  These indicate substantial agreement among the raters about the 
looks of the 94 faculty members. 
III.  The Impact of Beauty on Teaching Ratings 
A.  Basic Results 
  The basic model specifies a faculty member’s teaching ratings as determined by a vector 
of his/her characteristics, X, and by a vector of the course’s characteristics, Z.  Included in X are 
whether the professor is female, whether he/she is a minority, whether not a native English 
speaker, and whether on the tenure track.  The central variable in X is our composite measure of 
standardized beauty.  Z includes whether the course is upper- or lower-division, and whether it is 
for one credit.
5  (Twenty-seven of the classes were one-credit labs, physical education or other 
                                                           
5Age and a quadratic in age were included in other versions of the basic equation.  These terms were never 
significantly nonzero as a pair or individually, and they had essentially no impact on the coefficients of the   5
low-intensity activities that students tend to view differently from regular classes.)  Where sample 
sizes permit we examine the determinants of course evaluations in lower- and upper-division 
courses separately, since the students in the former may be more focused on the instructor 
him/herself and less on the degree to which the instructor can exposit the course material. 
  Table 3 presents weighted least squares estimates of the equations describing the average 
course evaluations.  As weights we use the number of students completing the evaluation forms in 
each class, because the error variances in the average teaching ratings are larger the fewer 
students completing the instructional evaluations.  We present robust standard errors that account 
for the clustering of the observations (because we observe multiple classes for the overwhelming 
majority of instructors) for each of the parameter estimates. 
    The striking fact from the estimates in the first column is the statistical significance of 
the composite standardized beauty measure.  The effects of differences in beauty on the average 
course rating are not small:  Moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above leads to an increase in the average class rating of 0.46, close to a one-standard 
deviation increase in the average class rating.
6  A complete picture of the importance of beauty in 
affecting instructors’ ratings is presented in Figure 1.  For instructors at each percentile of the 
distribution of beauty, the Figure shows the rating that the instructor would obtain if he/she had 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other terms in X and Z.  Similarly unimportant was an indicator of whether the faculty member was 
tenured.  If the one-credit classes are excluded the coefficient on standardized beauty rises to 0. 283. 
 
6This impact is at the intensive margin—among students who showed up in class on the day the course 
evaluations were completed.  If we examine the extensive margin—the impact on the fraction of students 
attending class on that day—we also find a positive and nearly statistically significant effect of composite 
standardized beauty.   6
other characteristics in X and Z at the sample means.  The instructional rating varies by nearly 
two standard deviations between the worst- and best-looking instructors in the sample. 
  That inferring the impact of professors’ looks on measures of their instructional 
productivity requires evaluations of their looks by several raters is demonstrated by sequential 
reestimates of the basic equation that include each of the six raters’ evaluations individually. 
While the class ratings are significantly related  to each rater’s views of the instructors, the 
estimated impacts range only from 0.12 to 0.23, i.e., below the estimates based on the composite 
standardized measure.  There is substantial measurement error in the individual beauty ratings. 
  Minority faculty members receive lower teaching evaluations than do majority 
professors, and non-native English speakers receive substantially lower ratings than do natives.  
Lower-division courses are rated slightly lower than upper-division courses.  Non-tenure-track 
instructors receive course ratings that are surprisingly almost significantly higher than those of 
tenure-track faculty.  This may arise because they are chiefly people who specialize in teaching 
rather than combining teaching and research, or perhaps from the incentives (in terms of 
reappointment and salary) that they face to please their students. 
Perhaps the most interesting result among the other variables in the vectors X and Z is the 
significantly lower rating received by female instructors, an effect that implies reductions in 
average class ratings of nearly one-half standard deviation.  This disparity departs from the 
consensus in the literature that there is no relationship between instructor’s gender and 
instructional ratings (Alexander, 1993).   
To explore this sex difference further we estimate the basic model separately for classes 
taught by male and female instructors. The results are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.  At 
the means of the variables the predicted instructional rating is lower for female instructors—the 
negative coefficient on the indicator in Column 1 is not an artifact of a correlation of perceived 
beauty and gender.  The reestimates show, however, that the impact of beauty on professors’ 
course ratings is much lower for female than for male faculty.  Good looks generate more of a   7
premium, bad looks more of a penalty for male instructors, just as was demonstrated (Hamermesh 
and Biddle, 1994) for the effects of beauty in wage determination. 
  Columns 4 and 5 show the results of estimating the equation separately for lower- and 
upper-division classes.  The impact of beauty on instructional ratings, while statistically 
significant in both equations, is over twice as large in lower-division classes.  Indeed, the same 
much bigger effects are found for two of the other variables that affected instructional ratings in 
the sample as a whole, whether the instructor is on the tenure track or is female.  We might be 
tempted to conclude that class ratings by more mature students, and students who are learning 
beyond the introductory level in a subject, are less affected by factors such as beauty that are 
probably unrelated to the instructor’s knowledge of the subject.  Yet the impacts of being a 
minority faculty member or a non-native English speaker are just as large in the estimates for 
upper-division courses as in those for lower-division courses.  It is unclear why the impacts of 
these variables among those in X are not attenuated in the more advanced courses.  These 
estimates may imply the existence of discrimination by students in their evaluations, or it may 
result from shortfalls in the ability of those instructors to transmit knowledge. 
B.  Robustness Tests 
  One might be concerned that a host of statistical problems plagues the estimates shown in 
Table 3 and means that our results are spurious.  One difficulty is a potential measurement error:  
Raters may be unable to distinguish physical attractiveness from good grooming and dress.  Were 
this merely classical measurement error, we would have no difficulties.  A subtle problem arises, 
however, if those who dress better, and whose photographs may thus be rated higher, are the 
same people who take care to be organized in class, to come to class on time, to hold their 
announced office hours, etc.  What if our measure of beauty is merely a proxy for the general 
quality of the faculty member independent of his/her looks? 
            To  account  for  this  possibility  we  created  an  indicator  equaling  one  for  male  faculty 
members who are wearing neckties in their pictures and for female faculty who are wearing a   8
jacket and blouse.  Formal pictures are on the websites of one-sixth of the faculty (weighted by 
numbers of students), and this indicator is added to a respecified version of the basic equation for 
which the results were shown in Column 1 of Table 3.  The estimated impacts of this indicator 
and of composite standardized beauty are presented in the first row of Table 4.  While instructors 
who present a formal picture do receive higher class ratings, the inclusion of this additional 
measure reduces the estimated impact of beauty only slightly.  The effect of composite 
standardized beauty remains quite large and highly significant statistically. We may conclude that 
the potential positive correlation of measurement error in the beauty ratings with unobservable 
determinants of teaching success does not generate serious biases in our estimates. 
Perhaps the most serious potential problem may result from a type of sample selectivity.  
Consider the following possibility:  Among a group of people (a department) those who place 
their photographs on their websites will, until equilibrium in the game is reached, be better-
looking than those who do not present their photographs.  They may also be people who are “go-
getters” in other aspects of their lives, including their classroom teaching.  If that is true, those 
instructors who are among the few in a department whose picture is available will be better 
looking and be better instructors, while those from departments with all pictures available will on 
average be average-looking and average instructors. 
To examine this potential problem we reestimate the basic equation on the subsample of 
84 faculty members, teaching 414 classes, in which an entire department’s faculty’s pictures are 
available.  The results of estimating the basic equation over this slightly reduced sample are 
shown in the second row of Table 4.  Compared to the basic estimate (0.275), accounting for this 
potential problem reduces the estimated impact of composite standardized beauty slightly and 
implies that a two-standard deviation change in beauty raises the course rating by 0.39 (three-
fourths of a standard deviation in course ratings).  Apparently this kind of selectivity matters a 
bit, but it does not vitiate the basic result.   9
The next possibility does not represent a potential bias in the basic results, but rather 
supposes that they may be masking some additional sample information.  There is some 
indication (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Hamermesh et al, 2002) that the effect of beauty on 
earnings is asymmetric, with greater effects of bad than of good looks.  Does this asymmetry 
carry over into its effects on productivity in college teaching?  To examine this possibility we 
decompose the composite standardized beauty measure into positive and negative values and 
reestimate the basic equation allowing for asymmetry.  The results are shown in the third row of 
Table 4.  The effect on course ratings of looking better than average is slightly below and 
opposite in sign to the effect of looking worse than average.
7  There is only slight evidence of 
asymmetry in the impact of instructors’ beauty on their course ratings. 
Another potential issue is that courses may attract students with different attitudes toward 
beauty. These may be correlated with the instructional ratings that the students give and may also 
induce departmental administrators to assign courses to instructors based on their looks.  Some 
courses may also generate different ratings depending on their difficulty, their level, and other 
differences, and these may be correlated with the instructor’s looks.  The gender mix of students 
may differ among courses, and this too may affect the estimated effects of beauty. To examine  
                                                           
7The t-statistic on the hypothesis that they are equal and opposite sign is 0.41.  This may not contradict 
results indicating asymmetric effects of beauty on earnings.  Many more individuals are rated above 
average in looks than are considered below average, so that the asymmetry might not exist if the beauty 
measure itself were symmetric, as it is by construction here.   10
these possibilities we take advantage of the fact that 157 of the 463 classes in our sample are 
instructed by more than one faculty member over the two years of observation.  These courses 
involve 54 different instructors (of the 94 in the sample).  We reestimate the basic equation on 
this subsample adding course fixed effects.  Thus any estimated effect of beauty will reflect 
within-course differences in the impact of looks on instructional ratings. 
The results are presented in the final row of Table 4.  The estimated impact of composite 
standardized beauty on class evaluations is somewhat smaller than in the other estimates, but still 
substantial.  This is mostly due to sampling variability:  Reestimating the basic equation of Table 
3 over this reduced sample of 157 classes yields an impact of composite standardized beauty on 
instructional ratings of 0.190  (s.e.=0.079).
8 
IV.  Conclusion and Interpretations 
  The estimates leave little doubt that measures of perceived beauty have a substantial 
independent positive impact on instructional ratings by undergraduate students.  We have 
accounted for a variety of possibly related correlates, and have shown that the estimated impacts 
are robust to potential problems of selectivity, correlated measurement error and other difficulties.  
The question is whether these findings really mean that beauty itself makes professors more 
productive in the classroom, or whether students are merely reacting to an irrelevant characteristic 
that differs among instructors. 
  The first issue is that our measure of beauty may merely be a proxy for a variety of 
related unmeasured characteristics that might positively affect instructional ratings.  To the extent 
that these are positively correlated with beauty but not caused by it, our results overstate the 
impact of beauty.  That we have held constant for as many course and instructor characteristics 
                                                           
8If we include a vector of indicators for departments in the basic equation in Table 3, we find a somewhat 
larger effect than here, although one that is still smaller than that in the basic equation.   11
as we have should mitigate some concerns about this potential problem.  If there is a 
characteristic that is caused by a person’s physical appearance and that also generates higher 
instructional ratings, then failing to measure it (and excluding it from the regressions) is correct.  
For example, if good-looking professors are more self-confident because their beauty previously 
generated better treatment by other people, and if their self-confidence makes them more 
appealing instructors, it is their beauty that is the ultimate determinant of their teaching success. 
  A second, and more important issue is whether higher instructional ratings mean that the 
faculty member is a better teacher—is more productive in stimulating students’ learning.  The 
instructional ratings may putatively reflect productivity, but do they really do so?  Discussions of 
this question among administrators and faculty members have proceeded since instructional 
evaluation was introduced, and we do not wish to add to the noise.  Regardless of the evidence 
and of beliefs about this issue, however, instructional ratings are part of what universities use in 
their evaluations of faculty performance—in setting salaries, in determining promotion, and in 
awarding special recognition, such as teaching awards.  Thus even if instructional ratings have 
little or nothing to do with actual teaching productivity, university administrators behave as if 
they believe that they do, and they link economic rewards to them.  Thus the ratings are at least 
one of the proximately affected outcomes of beauty that in turn feed into labor-market outcomes. 
  The most important issue is what our results tell us about whether students are 
discriminating against ugly professors or whether students really do learn less (assuming that 
instructional ratings reflect learning).  For example, what if students simply pay more attention to 
good-looking professors and learn more?  We would argue that this is a productivity effect—we 
would claim that the instructors are better teachers.  Others might (we think incorrectly) claim 
that the higher productivity arises from students’ (society’s) treating them differently from their 
worse looking colleagues and is evidence of discrimination.  Disentangling the effects of 
differential outcomes resulting from productivity differences and those resulting from   12
discrimination is extremely difficult in all cases, as we believe this unusual illustration of the 
impact of beauty on a physical measure that is related to earnings illustrates. 
  The epigraph to this study may be correct—someone who does not qualify to be a 
supermodel might well go into teaching.  Even in college teaching, however, our evidence 
demonstrates that a measure that is viewed as reflecting teaching productivity, whether it really 
does so or not, is also one that is enhanced by the instructor’s pulchritude.   13
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 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics, Courses, Instructors and Evaluations
a 
 
           All         Lower Division        Upper Division 
Variable 
 
Course evaluation      4.022        4.060        3.993 
    (0.525)    (0.563)      (0.493) 
 
Instructor evaluation      4.217        4.243        4.196 
    (0.540)    (0.609)      (0.481) 
 
Number of students     55.18        76.50        44.24 
    (75.07)    (109.29)    (45.54) 
 
Percent evaluating      74.43         73.52         74.89 
     
Female       0.359      0.300        0.405 
 
Minority      0.099      0.110        0.090 
 
Non-native  English     0.037      0.007        0.060 
     
Tenure  track      0.851      0.828        0.869 
 
Lower  division      0.339      --------        -------- 
 
Number of courses      463        157         306 
 
Number of faculty      94         42          79 
 
__________________________________________________________________                                                                            
aMeans with standard deviations in parentheses.  All statistics except for those describing the number of 
students, the percent evaluating the instructor and the lower-upper division distinction are weighted by the 
number of students completing the course evaluation forms. Table 2.  Beauty Evaluations, Individual and Composite 
 
 
                Average     Std. Dev.              Standardized: 
                     Minimum        Maximum 
  Individual Ratings: 
 
Male, Upper Division    4.43          2.18  -1.57    2.10 
 
Male, Upper Division    4.87          1.65  -2.34    2.50 
 
Female, Upper Division   5.18          2.05  -2.03    1.84 
 
Female, Upper Division   5.39          2.10  -2.10    2.20 
 
Male, Lower Division    3.53          1.70  -1.49    2.04 
 
Female, Lower Division   4.14           1.88  -1.67    2.05 
 
 Composite Standardized Rating: 
           0          0.83  -1.54    1.88 
 




         All    Males           Females       Lower      Upper  
                     Division     Division 
Variable 
 
Composite      0.275     0.384     0.128        0.359       0.166 
 stdzd. beauty    (0.059)   (0.076)   (0.064)      (0.092)    (0.061) 
 
Female      -0.239   --------    --------       -0.345    -0.093 
      (0.085)               (0.133)    (0.104) 
 
Minority     -0.249    0.060    -0.260       -0.288    -0.231 
       (0.112)   (0.101)   (0.139)      (0.156)    (0.107) 
 
Non-native English   -0.253   -0.427    -0.262       -0.374    -0.286 
       (0.134)   (0.143)   (0.151)      (0.141)    (0.131) 
 
Tenure track     -0.136   -0.056    -0.041       -0.187     0.005 
       (0.094)   (0.089)   (0.133)      (0.141)    (0.119) 
 
Lower division     -0.046    0.005    -0.228       --------    --------- 
     (0.101)   (0.111)   (0.129) 
 
R
2       .279     .359     .162        .510         .126 
 
N courses     463     268     195        157      306 
 
N faculty      94      54         40         42        79 
 
 
                                               ____________________________________ 
aRobust standard errors in parentheses here and in Table 4.  All the estimating equations also include an 









 Table 4.  Alternative Estimates of the Relation Between Beauty and Class Ratings (lower- 
and upper-division classes, N=463 unless otherwise noted) 
 
      V a r i a b l e  
 
          Composite  Formal picture  Composite stdzd. beauty: 
        stdzd. beauty         Above  Below 
                m e a n    m e a n  
 
1.  Photo bias    0.229        0.243 
    (individual)             (0.047)      (0.088) 
 
2.  Photo bias    0.236 
    (department)            (0.049) 
    (N = 414) 
 
3.  Asymmetric             0.237    - 0.318 
    beauty effect           (0.096)   (0.133) 
 
4.  Course fixed             0.177 
      effects             (0.107) 
    (N = 157) 
                                          _______________                           _____________________ 
aThe equations reported in Rows 1-3 also include all the variables included in the basic equation in Column 
1 of Table 3.  The equation reported in Row 4 excludes variables in the vector Z.  
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